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The important role of education in the process of economic development is well known. Less known is the effect of 
education on inequality. This is an important issue, since economic policies that promote growth often lead to higher 
income inequality. A policy that promotes growth and at the same time reduces inequality would be preferred. The 
question is whether promoting education is such a policy. In this paper, the determinants of income inequality in Israel 
are analyzed using regression-based inequality decomposition techniques, focusing on the role of years of schooling 
and type of education. In particular, we differentiate between general schooling and ultra-orthodox schooling, following 
the common belief that ultra-orthodox schooling is not as valuable as general schooling for labor market outcomes. 
Indeed, we find that years of general schooling of the household head have a positive effect on per-capita household 
income, while the effect of years of ultra-orthodox schooling is negative. Years of general schooling are positively 
correlated with income, while years of ultra-orthodox schooling are negatively correlated with income. This implies 
that a policy that closes the schooling gaps in the secular sector is equalizing, while a policy that closes the schooling 
gaps in the ultra-orthodox sector is disequalizing. In addition, a uniform percentage increase in years of general 
schooling reduces per-capita income inequality, while a similar increase in ultra-orthodox years of schooling increases 
inequality. These results are robust to the type of regression used (OLS versus Gini regression), the use of equivalence 
scales, and do not change qualitatively even when we allow all regression coefficients to be different in the ultra-
orthodox subsample. We conclude that policies directed at general schooling can potentially promote development and 
reduce inequality at the same time. However, when policy makers consider public funding of ultra-orthodox schools, 
they should take into account the adverse effects of this type of schooling on income inequality. In particular, we 
suggest that such funding will be conditioned on aligning the curriculum with the requirements of modern labor 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Education is one of the keys to success in the labor market. Years of schooling are often used as a 
quantitative measure of education. However, types of schools may differ substantially in their 
quality. In Israel, an on-going policy debate exists with regard to government funding of ultra-
orthodox schools that emphasize religious studies rather than topics that are associated with success 
in the labor market, such as math, sciences and English. It is often claimed that this is one of the 
reasons for the fact that many ultra-orthodox families are trapped in poverty (Gottlieb, 2007). 
Income inequality in Israel is one of the highest among Western countries (Ben David, 2009; OECD, 
2009). Evidence from other countries suggests that education is a key determinant of income 
inequality (Cholezas and Tsakloglou, 2007), although the empirical evidence is still mixed. For 
example, Park (1996) found that a higher level of educational attainment of the labor force has an 
equalizing effect on the distribution of income in a cross section of 59 countries. On the other hand, 
Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios (2009) found that the relationship between a good human capital 
endowment and income inequality is positive in the regions of the European Union. For Israel, it 
was found, using regression-based inequality decomposition techniques (Kimhi, 2009), that 
reducing inequality in years of schooling as well as increasing the average years of schooling could 
reduce income inequality. In this paper, we examine whether this result is independent of the type 
of schooling. Specifically, we try to replicate the earlier results while differentiating between ultra-
orthodox schooling and general schooling. We find that as opposed to general schooling, years of 
ultra-orthodox schooling increase income inequality. This result is robust to a variety of model and 
data specifications, including the type of regression used, adult equivalence scales, and sampling 
weights. 
In the next section we describe the regression-based inequality decomposition techniques. We also 
describe the Gini regression that is used as an alternative to OLS, and the method that we use to 
derive marginal effects of explanatory variables on inequality. The following section describes the 
data used in the empirical analysis. Then we move to the empirical results. The final section 
concludes with a discussion and some policy implications. 
 
2. Methodology 
The regression-based inequality decomposition techniques are directly derived from inequality 
decomposition by income sources. Hence, we will start by presenting this latter technique.  
 
Decomposition by income sources 
Shorrocks (1982) was the first to offer a unified approach to inequality decomposition by income 
sources. Earlier, Fei et al. (1978) and Pyatt et al. (1980), among others, offered a decomposition of 
the Gini index of inequality by income sources, but this happens to be a special case of Shorrocks' 
(1982) approach. Specifically, Shorrocks (1982) suggested focusing on inequality measures that can 
be written as a weighted sum of incomes: 
 
(1)   I(y) = Σiai(y)yi,  
 
where ai are the weights, yi is the income of household i, and y is the vector of household incomes. 
This class of inequality measures includes as special cases the Gini index as well as the family of 
Generalized Entropy indices. If income is observed as the sum of incomes from k different sources, 
yi=Σkyi
k, the inequality measure (1) can be written as the sum of source-specific components S
k: 
 





Dividing (2) by (1), one implicitly obtains the "proportional contribution" of income source k to 








Shorrocks (1982) noted that the decomposition procedure (3) yields an infinite number of potential 
decomposition rules for each inequality index, because in principle, the weights ai(y) can be chosen 
in numerous ways, so that the proportional contribution assigned to any income source can be made 
to take any value between minus and plus infinity. Still, the Gini-based inequality decomposition 
rule remains the most popular in the empirical literature, in part because of the popularity of the 
Gini index as an inequality measure, and, perhaps more importantly, because it offers an intuitive 
interpretation of the decomposition result. Specifically, the Gini decomposition rule can be obtained 
by using ai(y)=2(i-(n+1)/2)/(μn
2), where i is the index of observation after sorting the observations 
from lowest to highest income, n is the number of observations and μ is mean income. It has been 





k is the 
share of income from source k in total income, R
k is the "Gini correlation" between y
k and y, and G
k 
is the Gini index of y
k (e.g., Lerman and Yitzhaki 1985). In essence, a mean-preserving increase in 
inequality in an income source that is positively correlated with total income will increase the Gini 
index of total income, holding other income sources fixed. 
 
Decomposition by income determinants 
Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Fields (2003) extended the technique of inequality decomposition 
by income sources (3) to regression-based inequality decomposition by determinants of income. 
They suggested expressing household income (or log-income) as y=Xβ+ε, where X is a (nxk) matrix 
of explanatory variables (including a constant), β is a (kx1) vector of coefficients, and ε is a (nx1) 
vector of random error terms. Given a vector of consistently estimated coefficients b, income can be 
expressed as a sum of predicted income and a prediction error as: 
 
(4)  y = Xb+e.
  
 
Substituting (4) into (1) and dividing by (1), the share of inequality attributed to explanatory 
variable m is obtained as s
m = bmΣiai(y)xi
m/Σiai(y)yi.
1 Wan (2004) showed that this method can also 
be applied to nonlinear income-generating equations.  
 
Gini regression 
Olkin and Yitzhaki (1992) suggested the Gini regression as an alternative to OLS. Its main 
advantages are that (a) no linear connection is assumed between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables; and (b) it puts lower weights on outliers. The implication of (a) is that the 
Gini regression coefficients are implied partial derivatives of the dependent variable, and in this 
sense they are comparable in nature to OLS coefficients. To demonstrate (b), note that the estimated 
coefficient of the slope in the Gini regression is in fact an instrumental variable estimator where the 
rank of the observation in the distribution of the explanatory variable is used as the instrument 
(Olkin and Yitzhaki, 1992). Since the rank is less sensitive to outliers than the value of the 
explanatory variable itself, the estimator is less sensitive than the OLS estimator. Alternatively, it 
                                                  
1 Morduch and Sicular (2002) suggested a simple procedure to compute standard errors of s
m, but the procedure turns 
out to be incorrect. They claimed that since the components are linear in the regression coefficients, i.e. 
s
m=bmΣiai(y)xi
m/I(y), standard errors can be computed as σ(s
m)=  σ(bm)Σiai(y)xi
m/I(y). This ignores the fact that 
Σiai(y)xi
m/I(y) is itself a random variable that is not independent of bm (through the dependence of bm on y). Hence the 
true standard errors cannot be computed in such a simple way (which, in fact, results in t-statistics that are identical to 
those of the regression coefficients). As suggested by Cowell and Fiorio (2009), bootstrapping is used to obtain standard 
errors in the empirical application below.   4
can be shown that OLS coefficients are weighted average of slopes between each observation and 
the sample mean. The sensitivity of the OLS coefficients to outliers result from the weights, which 
are proportional to the square of the distances of observations from the sample mean. The Gini 
regression coefficients, on the other hand, are weighted sums of the slopes between all adjacent 
observations, where the weights are proportional to the distance between the observations (Olkin 
and Yitzhaki, 1992). Schechtman and Yitzhaki (2007) extended the Gini regression to the case of a 
multiple regression, which is used in this research. 
 
Marginal effects 
Several authors suggested, in the context of inequality decomposition by income sources, that a 
more interesting result is the effect on inequality of a uniform percentage increase in income from a 
certain source, holding income from other sources fixed. These "marginal effects" are more 
informative than the proportional contributions to inequality s
k when one wants to know whether a 
particular income source is equalizing or disequalizing (Podder, 1993; Podder and Chatterjee, 2002). 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) showed that the elasticity of the Gini index with respect a uniform 
percentage change in y
k is s
k-α
k. This brings us back to the intuitive observation made by Shorrocks 
(1983), that comparing s
k and α
k is useful for knowing whether the k
th income source is equalizing 
or disequalizing. The Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) formula can be adapted to the case of regression-
based inequality decomposition. Using the regression coefficients, it is possible to compute the 
“income shares” of the explanatory variables as α
m = bmΣixi
m/Σiyi, and evaluate the marginal effect 






The data for this research were taken from the 2006 Income Survey in Israel. In addition to a 
detailed account of household income, the survey collected personal information, such as age and 
schooling, about all household members over 15 years of age, as well as the demographic structure 
of the household, i.e. the number of household members in different age groups. The data set 
included 14,582 households, representing all Israeli households except for Kibbutzim and 
Collective Moshavim, where household income is not easy to define, and Bedouins living outside 
of recognized localities. The household head is defined as the household member with the largest 
number of hours worked per week. Several personal characteristics, religion for example, are 
available only for the household head.  
The income measure we use is gross (before tax) household income from all sources, including 
wages and salaries, self-employment income, profits, capital income (rents, profits, dividends), and 
public and private transfers. Mean per-capita income in the sample was NIS 3,682 per month. In 
addition to per-capita income, we also analyze income per equivalent adult. The number of 
equivalent adults is increasing with household size, but the marginal increase is decreasing 
(appendix 1). Mean income per equivalent adult was NIS 3,915 per month. Note that Wodon and 
Yitzhaki (2005) raised some concern about the use of equivalence scales in inequality analysis. 
Nevertheless, our aim is to examine the robustness of our inequality analysis to the use of 
equivalence scales. 
Variables used to explain household income include several household head characteristics: gender, 
marital status, religion, origin, age, and schooling. Gender is represented by a dummy variable for 
female-headed households. Marital status is represented by a dummy variable for unmarried (or 
separated) heads of household. Religion is represented by a dummy variable for non-Jewish heads 
of household. Origin is represented by a dummy variable for heads of household whose father was 
not born in Israel. Age and schooling are measured in years. We differentiate between ultra-
orthodox schooling and other types of schooling, using an indicator that the last type of school the 
household head attended was a yeshiva. We also add this indicator as an explanatory variable, and   5
another indicator variable is used to distinguish those with positive years of general schooling from 
those with no schooling. 
Additional explanatory variables include the demographic structure of the household, type of 
locality and geographic location. The demographic structure of the household is represented by two 
variables: number of adults (age 18+) and number of children (up to age 17). Type of locality is 
represented by three dummy variables: for small localities (up to 2,000 residents), mid-size 
localities (up to 200,000 residents) with a Jewish majority, and mid-size localities with a non-
Jewish majority. The excluded category includes localities with more than 200,000 residents. 
Geographic location is represented by six regional dummies: north, center-north, Jerusalem, center-
south, south, Judea and Samaria. The excluded category is the center region. A map of the regions 
can be found in appendix 2. The means of explanatory variables are shown in table 1. Note that the 
means of years of schooling are for the whole sample; the mean of years of ultra-orthodox 
schooling among the ultra-orthodox is of course much higher. 
 
4. Empirical analysis and results 
The estimation results of the income-generating equations are presented in table 2. We compare 
OLS regressions with Gini regressions, and compare two dependent variables, income per capita 
and income per equivalent adult. Most of the estimated marginal effects on income are robust, at 
least in terms of signs and significance, across the four specifications. This relates to the negative 
marginal effects associated with female-heads households, non-Jewish households, households with 
a foreign origin, households outside of the central region, and households in mid-size Jewish 
localities, as well as to the positive marginal effects associated with age, years of general schooling, 
and with households in small localities.
2 There are some exceptions of differences between the 
results of income per capita and income per equivalent adult, in the case of variables that are most 
sensitive to the demographic structure of the household. The most striking example is the number of 
adults, which has negative marginal effects on income per-capita but positive marginal effects on 
income per equivalent adult. The number of children has negative marginal effects always, but they 
are smaller in magnitude in the case of income per equivalent adult. The marginal effects on income 
associated with unmarried household heads are positive in the case of income per-capita and 
negative in the case of income per equivalent adult.
3 The most notable difference between the OLS 
results and those of the Gini regressions is with respect to the marginal effects on income of ultra-
orthodox years of schooling, which are always negative, but are much smaller in magnitude and 
insignificant in the Gini regressions. These differences implies that attention should be given to the 
sensitivity of the results when one of these variables is at the focus of the analysis. In our case, this 
applies especially to years of schooling. The negative coefficient means, at least when it is 
statistically significant, that more schooling leads to a lower standard of living for ultra-orthodox 
households, probably because this specific type of schooling does not enhance labor market 
qualifications but rather encourage the engagement in non-remunerative religious activities. 
Moving forward to the inequality decomposition results (table 3), we observe that the explanatory 
variables explain roughly 40% of income inequality. The difference between the OLS and the Gini 
regression results are negligible. There are a few differences between the decomposition results of 
income per capita and income per equivalent adult. The most notable one is the inequality 
contribution of the Female dummy, which is not statistically significant in the case of income per 
capita, and significantly positive in the case of income per equivalent adult. The positive 
                                                  
2 Age squared turned out negative in the OLS regression, as expected, but it was eliminated because the Gini regression 
cannot accommodate both a variable and its square. 
3 Evidently, virtually all unmarried household heads have no other adult in the household. This implies multicollinearity 
between number of adults and the unmarried dummy, and this could explain, at least in part, the opposite signs of their 
coefficients. The two variables are jointly significant, however, and removing the unmarried dummy did not change the 
coefficient of adults meaningfully.   6
contribution of this variable implies that eliminating the differences between male- and female-
headed households is likely to reduce income inequality. Similar conclusions can be drawn with 
regard to family size: eliminating the variability in the number of children, for example, can reduce 
per-capita income inequality quite substantially. This interpretation of the signs and magnitudes of 
the inequality contributions should be used with caution: it is not easy to generalize it to dummy 
variables that are part of a set of dummies (such as location), or to continuous variables that are 
interacted with dummy indicators (such as years of schooling). 
Table 4 includes the marginal effects of explanatory variables on inequality. Marginal effects are 
the changes in inequality that result from a uniform 1% increase in the value of each explanatory 
variable. The marginal effects are statistically significant, and are mostly consistent across the four 
specifications. The exceptions are those same variables for which regression coefficients vary 
across the specifications. In particular, the marginal effects on inequality of the number of adults are 
positive in the case of income per capita and negative in the case of income per equivalent adult. 
The opposite is true with respect to the marginal effects on inequality of being unmarried. The 
marginal effect of the number of children is always positive, but quantitatively smaller in the case 
of income per equivalent adult. A uniform fertility reduction is, therefore, a natural candidate for an 
equalizing policy target.  
The marginal effects of female-headed households, non-Jewish households and heads of household 
of foreign origin are all positive, indicating that an increase in the share of these population sub-
groups is likely to increase income inequality. The marginal effects of small localities and mid-size 
non-Jewish localities are also negative, while the marginal effects of mid-size Jewish localities are 
positive. The marginal effects of all the out-of-center regional dummies are positive, while age has 
a negative marginal effect on inequality. 
Another policy-sensitive variable is schooling. Years of general schooling have an equalizing 
marginal effect, with an elasticity that is the largest in magnitude among all explanatory variables. 
Years of ultra-orthodox schooling, on the other hand, have positive marginal effects on income 
inequality. Recall, though, that the marginal effects of this variable on income (table 2) were not 
always significant, and sensitive to the type of regression used. At least, it is quite obvious that a 
uniform percentage increase in years of ultra-orthodox schooling does not reduce income inequality, 
while a similar increase in years of general schooling does. 
The fact that only less than 2% of the sample households have ultra-orthodox schooling (table 1) 
raises the question of whether it is legitimate to assume that the regression coefficients, other than 
the coefficient of schooling, are the same for these and other types of households. To examine this 
issue, we have estimated the OLS per-capita income generation equation for the subset of 
households with positive years of ultra-orthodox schooling, and repeated the decomposition 
analysis using the estimated coefficients. Evidently, we could not use the complete set of 
explanatory variables as we did for the whole sample. There were no ultra-orthodox households in 
the non-Jewish population or in non-Jewish localities, and there was only one among the female-
headed households. The irrelevant explanatory variables were therefore removed from the model, as 
was the variable indicating years of general schooling. The remaining variables were used to derive 
the decomposition results in table 5. 
The estimated regression coefficients are in the second column, and they are naturally different than 
the coefficients estimated using the whole sample (table 2). Although most of the signs remained 
the same, the magnitudes and significance differed. The most noticeable differences are in the 
coefficients of the regional dummies, type of locality, unmarried, foreign origin, and number of 
children. This reflects the fact that the distributions of these variables in the ultra-orthodox 
subsample are different than in the complete sample (compare the means in tables 1 and 5). 
Interestingly, the negative coefficient of years of ultra-orthodox schooling remains qualitatively 
similar, and even becomes more statistically significant. As a result, the marginal effect of   7
schooling on inequality among ultra-orthodox households remains positive (fourth column), 




In this paper we have illustrated the use of regression-based inequality decomposition techniques to 
evaluate the impact of public policy on income inequality. Using Israel as a case study, we focused 
on the role of years of schooling and type of education, which are sensitive to government budget 
allocations. In particular, we differentiated between general schooling and ultra-orthodox schooling, 
following the common belief that ultra-orthodox schooling is not as valuable as general schooling 
for labor market outcomes. We found that years of general schooling of the household head have a 
positive effect on per-capita household income, while the effect of years of ultra-orthodox schooling 
is negative (but not always statistically significant). These differences carry over to different effects 
of schooling on inequality: a uniform percentage increase in years of general schooling reduces per-
capita income inequality, while a similar increase in ultra-orthodox years of schooling increases 
inequality. These results are robust to the type of regression used (OLS versus Gini regression), the 
use of equivalence scales, and do not change qualitatively even when we allow all regression 
coefficients to be different in the ultra-orthodox subsample. 
  We conclude that when policy makers consider the public funding of ultra-orthodox schools, 
they should take into account the adverse effects of this type of schooling on income inequality. In 
particular, we suggest that such funding will be conditioned on aligning the curriculum with the 



























                                                  
4 The marginal effects in tables 4 and 5 are not comparable in magnitude, because those in table 5 measure the impact 
on inequality among ultra-orthodox households only.   8
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Appendix 1: adult equivalence scales 
__________________________________________________ 
              Equivalent adults 
   ________________________________ 
Household size  Marginal  Cumulative  Average 
__________________________________________________ 
1    1.25   1.25   1.25 
2    0.75   2.00   1.00 
3    0.65   2.65   0.88 
4    0.55   3.20   0.80 
5    0.55   3.75   0.75 
6    0.50   4.25   0.71 
7    0.50   4.75   0.68 
8    0.45   5.20   0.65 
9+    0.40 
_________________________________________________ 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
   10




Note: the southern region is trimmed from below. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, and authors' definition of regions. 
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Table 1: explanatory variables 
__________________________________________________ 
Variable         Mean 
__________________________________________________ 
Female          0.363 
Unmarried         0.372 
Non-Jewish         0.134 
Foreign origin         0.741 
Age      47.651 
General schooling        0.959 
Years general schooling    12.618 
Ultra-Orthodox schooling      0.017 
Years ultra-orthodox schooling    0.302 
Adults          2.227 
Children         1.099 
Small  locality         0.053 
Mid-size Jewish locality      0.564 
Mid-size non-Jewish locality     0.095 
North          0.144 
North-center         0.181 
Jerusalem         0.106 
South-center         0.102 
South          0.134 
Judea & Samaria        0.028 
_________________________________________________ 
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Table 2: regression results 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable             OLS regression           Gini regression 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable    Per-capita  Income per   Per-capita  Income per 
    income   equivalent    income   equivalent   
    a d u l t      a d u l t  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Female         -0.770          -0.715   -0.768   -0.713 
        (-10.3)   (-9.56)   (-10.1)   (-9.49) 
Unmarried         0.177                 -0.334     0.013    -0.357 
        (2.34)   (-4.60)     (0.17)   (-4.85) 
Non-Jewish        -1.288                 -1.580    -1.091    -1.491 
           (-9.25)   (-11.5)   (-7.53)   (-10.5) 
Foreign origin        -0.453                 -0.423    -0.482    -0.467 
        (-3.01)   (-2.81)   (-3.16)   (-3.07) 
Age           0.021                  0.016     0.022     0.019 
        (9.06)     (6.91)     (8.65)     (7.82) 
General  schooling    -1.475   -1.751   -1.603   -1.929 
        (-10.8)   (-12.8)   (-11.6)   (-14.1) 
Years general schooling                    0.269                0.282     0.284     0.302 
        (25.0)     (25.8)     (25.7)     (26.9) 
Ultra-Orthodox schooling                  1.158                 0.840     1.189     0.648 
            (4.45)                (3.14)     (2.81)     (1.66) 
Years ultra-orthodox schooling          -0.021               -0.028    -0.006    -0.006 
        (-1.72)                (-2.19)    (-0.24)    (-0.27) 
Adults          -0.267                  0.103    -0.333     0.123 
          (-11.2)                (4.24)    (-9.36)     (3.62) 
Children                      -0.492     -0.366    -0.620    -0.415 
          (-25.1)                (-19.9)    (-27.0)    (-16.2) 
Small locality         0.442     0.598     0.512     0.618 
          ( 2 . 5 7 )      ( 3 . 3 0 )      ( 2 . 9 8 )      ( 3 . 4 0 )  
Mid-size Jewish locality      -0.404    -0.331    -0.361    -0.311 
        (-4.64)   (-3.82)   (-4.15)   (-3.58) 
Mid-size non-Jewish locality     0.059     0.141     0.112     0.162 
          (0.48)      (1.10)     (0.88)     (1.24) 
North         -1.139   -1.104   -1.141   -1.098 
        (-12.5)   (-11.7)   (-12.4)   (-11.6) 
North-center        -0.889   -0.828   -0.888   -0.828 
        (-8.55)   (-7.95)   (-8.55)   (-7.94) 
Jerusalem        -1.013   -1.027   -0.944   -1.007 
        (-8.03)   (-8.27)   (-7.44)   (-8.04) 
South-center        -0.473   -0.363   -0.437   -0.348 
        (-4.41)   -3.10)   (-4.07)   (-2.96) 
South         -1.112   -1.095   -1.059   -1.063 
        (-12.2)   (-11.2)   (-11.5)   (-10.8) 
Judea  &  Samaria        -1.168   -1.212   -1.089   -1.179 
        (-8.36)   (-7.99)   (-7.71)   (-7.75) 
Intercept           3.395     3.141 
          (15.8)      (15.1) 
R
2           0.178      0.150 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3: decomposition results: share of inequality attributed to each variable 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable             OLS regression           Gini regression 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable:    Per-capita  Income per   Per-capita  Income per 
    income   equivalent    income   equivalent 
      a d u l t      a d u l t  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Female       -0.001     0.009   -0.001     0.009 
    (-0.87)     (8.49)   (-0.90)     (8.50) 
Unmarried        0.003     0.003     0.000     0.003 
      (11.7)     (5.22)     (11.8)     (5.22) 
Non-Jewish        0.064     0.072     0.054     0.068 
      (34.1)     (32.8)     (34.1)     (32.8) 
Foreign  origin      -0.020   -0.016   -0.021   -0.017 
    (-26.5)   (-23.8)   (-26.5)   (-23.8) 
Age         0.022     0.006     0.022     0.007 
      (19.3)     (6.96)     (19.3)     (6.95) 
General  schooling  -0.018   -0.024   -0.020   -0.027 
    (-17.4)   (-18.9)   (-17.5)   (-18.9) 
Years general schooling      0.170     0.197     0.180     0.211 
      (38.1)     (39.9)     (38.1)     (39.9) 
Ultra-Orthodox  schooling   -0.007   -0.004   -0.007   -0.004 
    (-12.1)   (-11.5)   (-12.1)   (-11.5) 
years ultra-orthodox schooling   0.002     0.003     0.001     0.001 
      (11.5)     (10.9)     (11.5)     (10.9) 
Adults         0.014     0.001     0.018     0.002 
        (16.0)     (4.10)     (16.0)     (4.11) 
Children         0.131     0.065     0.165     0.074 
        (37.5)     (28.9)     (37.5)     (28.9) 
Small locality        0.001     0.003     0.001     0.003 
        (3.51)     (7.25)     (3.50)     (7.25) 
Mid-size  Jewish  locality     -0.007   -0.006   -0.007   -0.005 
      (-11.3)   (-10.7)   (-11.3)   (-10.7) 
Mid-size  non-Jewish  locality    -0.002   -0.005   -0.004   -0.005 
      (-30.1)   (-28.7)   (-30.2)   (-28.7) 
North          0.030       0.026     0.029     0.026 
        (22.0)     (20.2)     (22.0)     (20.2) 
North-center        0.001       0.002     0.001     0.002 
        (1.01)     (2.39)     (1.00)     (2.40) 
Jerusalem        0.009       0.008     0.008     0.008 
        (8.26)     (7.51)     (8.28)     (7.49) 
South-center      -0.004   -0.004   -0.004   -0.004 
      (-10.1)   (-11.5)   (-10.1)   (-11.5) 
South          0.011       0.011     0.010     0.010 
        (9.58)     (9.44)     (9.57)     (9.43) 
Judea & Samaria       0.002       0.000     0.002     0.000 
        (3.32)     (0.72)     (3.31)     (0.72) 
Residual       0.601          0.653     0.572     0.639 
        (74.3)     (89.9)     (65.7)     (84.2) 
Total         1.000     1.000     1.000     1.000 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: t statistics in parentheses (based on bootstrapped standard errors).   14
Table 4: marginal effects on inequality (%) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable             OLS regression           Gini regression 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent variable:    Per-capita  Income per   Per-capita  Income per 
    income   equivalent    income   equivalent 
      a d u l t      a d u l t  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Female         0.076     0.076     0.076     0.076 
      (59.3)     (52.6)     (59.3)     (52.6) 
Unmarried    -0.014     0.034   -0.001     0.036 
    (-46.6)     (45.1)   (-45.7)     (45.0) 
Non-Jewish        0.110     0.125     0.093     0.118 
      (33.3)     (41.3)     (33.4)     (41.2) 
Foreign  origin        0.072     0.064     0.076     0.071 
     (85.4)     (82.6)     (85.4)     (82.6) 
Age     -0.257   -0.187   -0.259   -0.224 
    (-98.8)   (-106)   (-98.8)   (-106) 
General schooling     0.362     0.399     0.393     0.439 
      (96.5)     (99.4)     (96.5)     (99.4) 
Years general schooling              -0.740                -0.699    -0.782    -0.748 
        (-109)                (-98.7)    (-109)    (-98.7) 
Ultra-Orthodox  schooling   -  0.012   -0.008   -0.013   -0.006 
    (-14.5)   (-14.4)   (-14.6)   (-14.4) 
Years ultra-orthodox schooling          0.004     0.005     0.001     0.001 
      ( 13.9)     (14.0)     (14.6)     (14.3) 
Adults       0.173   -0.056     0.216   -0.067 
      (77.1)   (-96.1)     (77.1)   (-96.1) 
Children                    0.278     0.168     0.351     0.191 
      (49.9)     (51.0)     (49.9)     (51.0) 
Small  locality    -0.005   -0.005   -0.006   -0.005 
    (-15.7)   (-10.7)   (-16.0)   (-10.6) 
Mid-size Jewish locality                 0.054     0.042     0.048     0.039 
      (71.4)     (60.6)     (71.4)     (60.6) 
Mid-size  non-Jewish  locality  -0.004   -0.008   -0.007   -0.010 
    (-28.6)   (-36.1)   (-28.3)   (-36.1) 
North       0.076          0.068     0.076     0.067 
      (31.3)     (43.9)     (31.3)     (43.9) 
North-center       0.045       0.041     0.045     0.041 
      (35.1)     (39.6)     (35.2)     (39.6) 
Jerusalem       0.036       0.034     0.033     0.033 
      (26.6)     (26.8)     (26.6)     (26.8) 
South-center      0.009     0.006     0.008     0.005 
      (16.8)     (15.1)     (16.7)     (15.2) 
South       0.051          0.048     0.049     0.046 
      (32.0)     (30.9)     (32.0)     (30.9) 
Judea & Samaria                  0.012       0.010     0.011     0.010 
      (15.7)     (13.3)     (15.7)     (13.3) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Marginal effect is the percentage change in the Gini coefficient as a result of a uniform 1%  
increase in the explanatory variable. t statistics in parentheses (based on bootstrapped standard errors). 
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 Table 5: results for households with ultra-orthodox schooling  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
    Sample Regression    Inequality  Marginal 
    m e a n
(a)   coefficient
(b)   contribution
(c) effect on 
          i n e q u a l i t y
(c) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Unmarried        0.080    0.512     0.021    -0.004 
        (1.34)     (2.69)   (-0.61) 
Foreign origin       0.669    0.188     0.011    -0.065 
        (1.32)     (2.53)   (-9.60) 
Age         42.06     0.033     0.118   -0.727 
        (4.09)     (4.77)   (-14.4) 
Ultra-Orthodox schooling    17.26   -0.027    0.010     0.288 
      (-3.54)     (1.41)     (13.1) 
Adults         2.355   -0.180     0.016     0.274 
           (-2.44)     (1.84)     (13.4) 
Children        3.239   -0.192     0.225     0.604 
           (-8.14)     (8.50)     (12.0) 
Small locality       0.024    0.338     0.007     0.002 
             (0.54)     (2.21)     (1.14) 
Mid-size Jewish locality    0.550   -0.013   -0.000    0.004 
      (-0.06)   (-1.05)     (8.73) 
North          0.048      0.354     0.009    -0.001 
             (1.40)     (2.26)   (-0.44) 
North-center        0.032     -0.816   -0.003    0.012 
           (-2.12)   (-0.40)     (1.06) 
Jerusalem        0.446     -0.288    0.017     0.095 
           (-1.18)     (2.14)     (7.99) 
South-center        0.052    0.207     0.005    -0.002 
           (0.65)     (2.01)   (-1.21) 
South          0.080     -0.390    0.005     0.024 
           (-1.18)     (0.94)     (3.47) 
Judea & Samaria      0.120     -0.180    0.006     0.019 
           (-0.81)     (1.79)     (4.51) 
Intercept               1.747          
             (4.61)      
Residual                   0.554      
               (13.3)      
_____________________________________________________________________ 
(a) 251 observations. 
(b) The dependent variable is income per-capita. R
2=0.377. t statistics in parentheses.  
(c) t statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors.  
 
 
 
  
 
 